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New Thinking on "Shareholder Primacy"
Lynn A. Stout

Abstract
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, many observers had come to believe that U.S.
corporate law should, and does, embrace a "shareholder primacy" rule that requires corporate
directors to maximize shareholder wealth as measured by share price. This Essay argues that such
a view is mistaken.
As a positive matter, U.S. corporate law and practice does not require directors to maximize
"shareholder value" but instead grants them a wide range of discretion, constrained only at the
margin by market forces, to sacrifice shareholder wealth in order to benefit other constituencies
and the firm itself. Although recent "reforms" designed to promote greater shareholder power have
begun to limit this discretion, U.S. corporate governance remains director-centric.
As a normative matter, several lines of theory have emerged in modem corporate scholarship
that independently explain why director governance of public firms is desirable from shareholders'
own perspective. These theories suggest that if we want to protect the interests of shareholders
as a class over time-rather than the interest of a single shareholder in today's stock
price-conventional shareholder primacy thinking is counterproductive. The Essay reviews five of
these lines of theory and explores why each gives us reason to believe that shareholder primacy
rules in public companies in fact disadvantage shareholders. It concludes that shareholder primacy
thinking in its conventional form is on the brink of intellectual collapse, and will be replaced by
more sophisticated and nuanced theories of corporate structure and purpose.
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financialisation, corporate law and economics, theory of the firm
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Introduction: The Rise of Shareholder Primacy Thinking
Of all the controversies in U.S. corporate law, one has proven most fundamental and
enduring. This is, of course, the debate over the proper purpose of the public
corporation.' Should the public company seek only to maximize the wealth of its
shareholders (the so-called "shareholder primacy" view)? Or should public
corporations be run in a manner that considers the interests of other corporate
"stakeholders" as well, including employees, consumers, even the larger society?
The Great Debate (as it has been characterized by two sitting and one former
member of the Delaware judiciary) 2 dates back at least to the initial emergence of the
public corporation as a powerful business form in the early twentieth century.3 For
several decades afterwards, the two sides in the controversy seemed evenly matched,
with perhaps a slight advantage to the "managerialist" view that corporations should
be run in the interests of not just shareholders, but also stakeholders and society at
large.
This changed in the 1970s with the rise of the Chicago School of economists.
Prominent members of the School argued that economic analysis could reveal the
proper goal of corporate governance quite clearly, and that goal was to make
shareholders as wealthy as possible. Thus Nobel-prize winner Milton Friedman
argued in the pages of the New York Times Sunday magazine that because
shareholders "own" the corporation, the only "social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits." 4 Tn more-academic writings, Michael Jensen and William
Meckling published their influential paper on the theory of firm, describing

1See e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, "Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins:
Adolph Berle and the Modern Corporation", 34 J. Corp. L. 99 (2008). Before the emergence of the
publicly-held company the question of corporate purpose was far less salient. The reason is simple:
one can safely assume that a corporation with a controlling shareholder will be managed, for good or
for ill, in a fashion that is agreeable to that shareholder. See infra text accompanying note 31
(discussing importance of distinguishing publicly-held firms from firms with controlling shareholders)
2 William T. Allen, et al., "The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual
Divide", 69 Chi. L. Rev. 1007 (2002).
3 In 1932, Adolph A. Berle engaged in a spirited debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review with
Harvard Professor E. Merrick Dodd over the proper purpose of the new business entity. According to
Berle, "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation ... [are] at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of the shareholders ... " Adolph A. Berle, "Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust", 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1932). Dodd disagreed, instead favoring "a view of the
business corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making
function." E. Merrick Dodd, "For Whom are Our Corporate Managers Trustees?" 45 Harv. L. Rev.
1144, 1148 (1932).
4 Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits", New York Times
Sunday Magazine, September 13, 1970, at 33-32 and 122-26. See Jean-Philippe Rob6, "Being Done
with Milton Friedman", Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium 2 (2012), this issue.
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shareholders in a corporation as principals who hire corporate officers and directors
to act as their agents. 5 According to this thesis, corporate managers' only job was to
maximize the wealth of the shareholders (the firm's supposedly sole "residual
claimants") by every means possible short of violating the law. Directors and officers
who pursued any other goal only reduced social wealth by increasing "agency costs."
Such arguments appealed to a number of groups for a number of reasons. To
legal scholars, the application of economic theory lent an attractive patina of
scientific rigor to the shareholder side of the longstanding "shareholders versus
stakeholders" dispute. To the popular press and business media, shareholder primacy
offered an easy-to-explain, sound-bite description of what corporations are and what
they are supposed to do. To businesspeople and reformers seeking a way to
distinguish between good and bad governance practices, the shareholder-centric view
promised a single, easily-read measure of corporate performance in the form of share
pnce.
The end result was that the Chicago economists significantly shifted the
balance of opinion in the Great Debate. By the 1990s, most scholars and regulators,
and even many business practitioners, had come to accept shareholder wealth
maximization as the proper goal of corporate governance. Some commentators
continued to argue valiantly for a more stakeholder-friendly view of the public
corporation, but they were increasingly dismissed as sentimental, sandals-wearing
leftists whose hearts outweighed their heads. Shareholder primacy became widely
viewed as the only intellectually respectable theory of corporate purpose, and
"maximize shareholder value" the only proper goal of boards of directors.
My use of the past tense is not inadvertent. This essay argues that the
shareholder primacy view, as conventionally understood, has reached its zenith and is
poised for decline. The classic shareholder-oriented model of the firm is being
rapidly undermined by new developments in corporate theory, as well as changes in
business practice and recent empirical studies. These developments make clear that
shareholders are not a homogeneous mass with a homogeneous interest in
maximizing today's share price. To the contrary, shareholders' interests are divided
along many fault lines, including schisms between investors with short versus long
holding periods; between investors eager to make ex ante commitments to
stakeholders and those eager to opportunistically renege on those commitments ex
post; and between asocial investors who care about only their own material returns
and prosocial investors concerned about the fates of others, future generations, and
the planet. To survive, shareholder primacy theory must address and account for
these differences in shareholder interest, and evolve into a more complex and far
more subtle understanding of what shareholders truly "value" and what they seek
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure", 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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from corporations as a class and over time. In the process, it will likely come to
resemble its former rival, the stakeholder model, far more closely. In many cases the
two may merge. Although the Great Debate may not be resolved entirely, the distance
between the two sides in the debate seems destined to shrink dramatically.

1. Shareholder Primacy Reaches Its Apogee
The high-water mark for traditional shareholder primacy thinking was perhaps set
early in 2001, when Professors Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmann-leading
corporate scholars from the Harvard and Yale law schools, respectively-published
an essay entitled "The End of History for Corporate Law."6 Echoing the title of
Frances Fukayama's book about the overwhelming triumph of capitalist democracy
over communism,7 Hansmann and Kraakman argued that shareholder primacy
thinking similarly had triumphed over other theories of corporate purpose.
"[A]cademic, business, and governmental elites," they wrote, shared a consensus
"that ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the
managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the
corporation in the interests of its shareholders; ... and the market value of the publicly
traded corporation's shares is the principal measure of the shareholders' interests."
As a result "there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should ... strive to increase ... shareholder value." 9 What's more, Hansmann and
Kraakman observed, this "standard shareholder-oriented model" not only dominated
U.S. discussions of corporate purpose, but conversations abroad as well. In their

6 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law", 89 Geo, L. J. 439

(2001).
7 Frances Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992).
Hansmann and Kraakman, "The End of History", supra note 6 at 440-41.
9 Id. at 439. I have omitted from this quote two fundamental qualifications that appear in the original
article, which reads "there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value" (emphasis added). I have left out the
qualifiers "principally" and "long-term" because the more one tries to rely on them, the more they
undermine and indeed destroy Hansmann's and Kraakman's main thesis as they express it elsewhere:
that managers should be directly accountable "only" (not merely "principally") to shareholders'
interests, and that the "market value of the publicly traded corporations shares"-meaning,
presumably, today's market value, not yesterday's or tomorrow's-"is the principal measure of its
shareholders' interests." Id. at 440-41. With apologies to Professors Hansmann and Kraakman, I
emphasize their more-unqualified expression of the shareholder primacy thesis in this Essay because I
think it better represents the dominant form of shareholder primacy thinking at the turn of the
millenium, and so offers the best foil for my arguments. I agree, however, with their highly-qualified
version, as the balance of this Essay attests.
4
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words, "the triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation is now
assured" not only in the U.S., but the rest of the civilized world.10
Hansmann and Kraakman were quite correct in observing that, as a
descriptive matter, the ideas that corporations should be run to maximize shareholder
wealth as measured by share price, and that shareholders should enjoy ultimate
control over public companies, dominated corporate law discussions in early 2000.
There were several ironic aspects, however, to their prediction this state of affairs
would prove permanent. For one thing, it was only a few months later that Enron's
collapse provided a dramatic object lesson in the perils of management obsession
with share price. But there were more subtle and important ironies in the timing of
their announcement.
In particular, even as shareholder primacy thinking was embraced with nearconsensus, three ironic realities of business law, practice, and theory were becoming
clear. First, around the same time Hansmann's and Kraakman's "End of History"
essay appeared, several prominent legal scholars published articles detailing how
U.S. corporate law does not, in fact, follow the shareholder primacy model. Contrary
to the predictions of the shareholder-oriented model, shareholders do not either own
or control public corporations, nor are corporate directors obligated to maximize
share price. Second, the corporate world in general, and equity investors in particular,
gave every sign of preferring this state of affairs. Although the enabling and statebased nature of U.S. corporate law allows corporate promoters a great deal of leeway
to select corporate rules that come closer to the shareholder primacy ideal by giving
shareholders greater power, it was becoming increasingly apparent that promoters
generally chose to go in the opposite direction, choosing rules that weakened
shareholder authority-and shareholders were enthusiastically endorsing this
approach by opening their wallets and buying the promoted shares. Third and perhaps
most striking, important developments in the theoretical literature on shareholders'
interests began to highlight how conventional shareholder primacy rested on shaky
foundations, and might be intellectually incoherent. After all, the idea of
"maximizing shareholder value" implicitly assumes that shareholder have but one
"value," today's share price. Yet if different shareholders have different values-and,
as we shall see, they inevitably must-shareholder primacy in its conventional form
crumbles.
The rest of this Essay examines each of these ironies in turn. In the process, it
lays the foundation for several important lessons to be learned from the new thinking
on shareholder primacy.

10 Hansmann and Kraakman, "The End of History", supra note 6 at 468.
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2. The Positive Case Against Shareholder Primacy
Even as shareholder primacy thinking gained traction among laypersons and the
business media in the 1980s and 1990s, it was becoming increasingly clear to legal
specialists that U.S. law historically did not, and still does not, actually follow the
"standard" shareholder-oriented model. (Hansmann and Kraakman implicitly
recognized this in their essay when they suggested shareholder primacy thinking
would lead to the "reform" of corporate law.) 11 I have discussed this factual reality in
great detail elsewhere,12 as have many others, so I will not offer more than a brief
survey here. The most important points are obvious to any corporate lawyer.
Shareholders do not own corporations: corporations are independent legal entities
that own themselves. Nor do shareholders control public corporations; this job is
delegated to a board of directors whom public shareholders influence only indirectly,
if at all.
Commentators often blithely assert that shareholders are the corporation's
ultimate "owners," but this is a patently incorrect. Corporations are independent legal
entities that own themselves, just as human beings own themselves. Just as humans
can, corporations can own property, commit crimes, pay taxes, and negotiate
contracts. One type of contract that corporations frequently (but not always) 14
negotiate is the sale of equity shares. Equity investors who purchase shares from a
corporation gain certain rights, just as investors who buy corporate bonds gain certain
rights. In particular, equity investors typically purchase the right to vote on certain
matters, the right to sue in certain circumstances, and the right to sell their shares to
other investors. But these legal rights are of remarkably little value to shareholders
seeking to force directors of a public company to act as their "agents" and serve only
their interests.
Consider first shareholder voting rights. As a matter of law these are severely
limited in scope, principally to the right to elect and remove directors. Shareholders
have no right to select the company's CEO; they cannot require the company to pay
them a single penny in dividends; they cannot vote to change or preserve the
Hansmann and Kraakman, "The End of History", supra note 6 at 439.
See, e.g., Margaret Blair & Lynn A. Stout, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law", 85 Va.
L. Rev. 247 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, "Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy", 75 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1189 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, "The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control", 93 Va. L.
Rev. 789 (2007).
13 See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 2 at 1202; Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control (1995); Einer
Elhauge, "Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest", 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 733 (2005). For a
recent article in the legal-economic literature in the same vein, see Jean-Philippe Robe, "The Legal
Structure of the Firm", 1 (1) Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium (2011). DOI:
hTnp//dxdoiorg/1o2202/2152-2820 1001
12

1Nonprofit

corporations typically operate without equity shareholders.
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company's line of business; they cannot stop directors from squandering revenues on
employee raises, charitable contributions, or executive jets; and they cannot vote to
sell the company's assets or the company itself (although they may in some cases
vote to veto a sale or merger proposed by the board). The rules of voting procedure
further limit exercise of the shareholder franchise. Delaware law, for example,
presumes only directors have authority to call a special shareholders' meeting, and
shareholders who wait for the regularly-scheduled annual meeting to try to elect or
remove directors must pay to solicit proxies. Finally and perhaps most significant, in
a public firm with widely-dispersed share ownership, shareholder activism is a public
good, and shareholders' own rational apathy raises an often-insurmountable obstacle
to collective action. As Robert Clark has put it, a cynic could easily conclude that
shareholder voting in a public company is "a mere ceremony designed to give a
veneer of legitimacy to managerial power."Is
What about shareholders' right to sue corporate officers and directors for
breach of fiduciary duty if they fail to maximize shareholder wealth? Here, too,
shareholders' "rights" turn out to be illusory. The fiduciary duty of loyalty precludes
officers and directors from using their corporate positions to line their own pockets.
They remain free, however, to pursue other goals unrelated to shareholder wealth
under the comforting mantle of the business judgment rule. As I have pointed out in
writings with Margaret Blair, courts consistently permit directors "to use corporate
funds for charitable purposes; to reject business strategies that would increase profits
at the expense of the local community; to avoid risky undertakings that would benefit
shareholders at creditors' expense; and to fend off a hostile takeover at a premium
price in order to protect employees or the community."16 Contrary to the shareholder
primacy thesis, shareholders cannot recover against directors or officers for breach of
fiduciary duty simply because those directors and officers favour stakeholders'
interests over the shareholders' own.
Finally, a shareholder's right to sell her shares sometimes can protect an
individual investor who wants to express her unhappiness with a board by "voting
with her feet." But disappointed shareholders cannot sell en masse without driving
down share price, making selling a Pyrrhic solution. An important exception to this
rule arises when shareholders as a group have the opportunity to sell to a single buyer
who, because he does not face collective action problems, can depose an incumbent
board more readily. During the 1970s and early 1980s, as the Chicago economists'
arguments began to gain steam and changes in the banking industry made hostile
takeover bids more feasible, it appeared that just such a lively "market for corporate
control" might develop. A series of legal developments, however, soon brought
hostile takeovers to an effective halt. The list is legion, but prominent examples
1
16

Robert C. Clark, CorporateLaw 95 (Little, Brown 1986).
Blair & Stout, supra note 12 at 303.
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include the passage by almost every state of some form of antitakeover statute; the
invention of the "poison pill" defence by uber-corporatelawyer Martin Lipton; and
the effective reversal of the Delaware Supreme Court's 1986 Revlon ruling (which
seemed to require boards facing a hostile offer to maximize shareholder wealth) by
subsequent opinions issued only a few years later.1 7 By the mid-1990s, U.S. corporate
law may have insulated incumbent directors from the pressures of the market for
control even more effectively than it did in 1970, when Milton Friedman trumpeted
shareholder primacy in the pages of the New York Times.
In sum, as a positive matter, the standard shareholder-oriented model simply
fails to describe the legal reality of U.S. public companies. But the positive
weaknesses of the shareholder primacy model do not stop here. Even as U.S.
corporate law stubbornly refuses to follow the dictates of shareholder primacy,
common corporate practices in many firms weaken shareholders' power and
influence still further. Public investors themselves seem to be perfectly content with
this result.
To understand this point it is important to understand that U.S. corporate law
is "enabling," meaning that corporate promoters can to a great extent choose the rules
that apply to their firms. They can do this in at least two ways. First, they can select a
state of incorporation. (Under the "internal affairs" doctrine, corporations are
governed by the rules of the state in which the promoter chooses to incorporate).
Second, they can add customized provisions to the corporate charter that enhance, or
dilute, either directors' or shareholders' power. For the past two decades, promoters
have been taking advantage of the enabling nature of U.S. corporate law to select
governance rules that insulate boards from shareholder influence. Studies have found,
for example, that states that offer directors strong protection against hostile takeovers
seem more successful in attracting new incorporations and in retaining existing firms
than states whose laws are more "shareholder friendly." 1 8
The trend away from shareholder primacy is even more obvious when we
examine charter provisions. Most states allow or require a company's charter to
include an affirmative statement describing and limiting the corporation's purpose. If
a company's founders thought such a charter provision would appeal to equity
investors, they could easily put in the charter that the company's purpose is to
"maximize shareholder value." I have never seen such a provision; instead, the
overwhelming majority of charters simply state that the corporation's purpose is to do
anything "lawful." Even more compelling, when promoters do tinker with
shareholder rights in the charter, they almost always move in the opposite direction,
weakening shareholder influence. For example, many firms (Google, Linkedin,
Zynga) "go public" with dual-class voting structures that disenfranchise public
See Stout, "Bad and Not-So-Bad", supra note 11 at 1204.
" See Stout, "Bad and Not So Bad", supra note 12 at note 53 (citing studies).
17
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shareholders almost entirely. In contrast, charter provisions that make it easier for
shareholders to force directors to do their bidding "are so rare as to be almost
nonexistent." 19
Such empirical realities set the stage for the third irony associated with
Hansmann's and Kraakman's 2001 declaration that shareholder value thinking had
triumphed. Even as shareholder primacy model was achieving the status of received
truth, experts were beginning to question not only its positive accuracy, but its
theoretical foundations.
To use the phrase Thomas Kuhn made famous in his classic 1962 book The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by 2001 the shareholder primacy model had
become the "dominant paradigm" for understanding the purpose of the corporation.
But it failed to explain at least two important empirical anomalies. First, the default
rules of U.S. corporate law simply refused to treat shareholders as "owners,"
"principals," or "residual claimants." Unlike owners, shareholders lacked the ability
to control how the corporation used its assets and outputs. Unlike principals,
shareholders lacked the power to command the board. And unlike residual claimants,
shareholders were not entitled to demand to receive even a penny of the corporation's
profits, assuming the company had "profits" in the first place. (Although the point
may be obvious, it is perhaps worth reminding readers that profit is an accounting
concept that depends on expenses as well as revenues, with the result that the amount
of profit earned by a company to a great degree is determined by its board)20
The second anomaly that could not be easily explained by the standard model
was that corporate promoters bringing new firms to market often took advantage of
the enabling nature of U.S. law to weaken shareholders' already-weak position in the
firm even further. This observation was especially puzzling because it suggested that
shareholdersthemselves did not object to director control over corporate assets and
corporate purpose. After all, prospective investors who are thinking of buying shares
in an IPO can easily determine the company's state of incorporation and the nature of
its charter. If they are troubled by governance structures that dilute shareholder rights,
they should discount their willingness to pay accordingly. Corporate promoters
cannot pull the wool over shareholders' eyes at the IPO stage. If they structure the
firm in a fashion that harms investors, it is the promoters themselves who should pay
the price, because they have devalued the very shares they are trying to sell.

19 John C. Coates IV, "Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers", 89 Cal. L.
Rev. 1301, 1397 (referring specifically to provisions that restrict directors' ability to employ poison
pills).
20 For a further development on accounting and the theory of the firm, see Yuri Biondi, "The Firm as
an Entity: Management, Organization, Accounting" (August 2, 2005). Universith degli Studi di Brescia
Working Paper No. 46. URL: http:I/ssrncomabstract=774764
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As Kuhn famously observed, wherever one finds persistent empirical
anomalies inconsistent with a dominant theory's predictions, one eventually finds at
least a few free-thinking (or foolhardy) souls who want to understand and explain
those anomalies. Eventually these free spirits may develop a new, alternative theory.
When they do, the battle begins: many of the intellectual leaders who built their
careers on the original paradigm can be expected to fight tooth and nail to kill off the
newcomer. But if the new theory is sound-if it does a better job of explaining what
we observe in the real world than the old theory does-it will win hearts and minds,
and ultimately prevail. Of course, the process may be slow. In science, it is said that
intellectual progress is made "one funeral at a time."
There is reason to hope the pace in corporate theory be more brisk. Even as
Hansmann and Kraakman were announcing the triumph of the shareholder wealth
maximization paradigm in 2001, corporate theorists--including Hansmann and
Kraakman themselves--were busily at work exploring not just one, but several,
alternative theoretical models of shareholder interest that might explain why equity
investors seemed content to cede control over corporate assets and purpose to boards
of directors. In today's literature one can identify multiple lines of thought that
challenge the traditional shareholder primacy paradigm, while simultaneously
offering to explain the twin anomalies of director control in the default rules of U.S.
law, and promoter preference for even greater director control at the IPO stage.
This Essay provides a guide to five of the most promising alternative new
theories being offered by today's experts in law, business, and economics. These five
theories have two important elements in common. First, as noted earlier, as a
historical matter, challenges to shareholder primacy have focused on the fear that
what is good for shareholders might be bad for other corporate stakeholders
(customers, employees, creditors), or for the larger society. The new theories
surveyed here focus on the possibility that shareholder value thinking harms
shareholdersthemselves, collectively and over time.
Second, the new theories raise this counterintuitive possibility by showing
how "the shareholder" is an artificial and misleading construct. Most corporate equity
is ultimately held by human beings, either directly or indirectly through pension
funds and mutual funds. Where "shareholders" are homogeneous, people are diverse.
Some plan to own their stock for short periods, and care only about tomorrow's stock
price, while others expect to hold their shares for decades and worry about the
company's long-term future. Some need immediate liquidity, while others can afford
to "lock in" their investments. Some buy shares in new ventures and want their
companies to make commitments that attract the loyalty of customers and employees,
while others who buy shares later want the company to renege on those
commitments. Some investors are highly diversified, and worry how the company's
actions will affect the value of their other interests, while others are undiversified and

10
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unconcerned. Finally, many people are "prosocial," meaning they are willing to
sacrifice at least some profits to allow the company to act in an ethical and socially
responsible fashion. Others care only about their own material returns.
In urging corporate managers to focus only on "maximizing shareholder
value" (share price), conventional shareholder primacy ideology assumes away all
these differences between and among the human beings who own any company's
stock. 21 It ignores the fact that different shareholdershave different values. Instead,
it assumes a monolithic shareholder who cares only about one company's stock price,
only today. This approach reduces investors to their lowest possible common human
denominator: impatient, improvident, opportunistic, self-destructive, and
psychopathically indifferent to others' welfare. As a result, shareholder primacy
ideology can keep public corporations from doing their best for either their investors,
or society as a whole.
The balance of this Essay is devoted to exploring these five emerging theories
of diverging shareholder interests and director control. Given space constraints I
cannot do them justice, and I urge interested readers to consult the primary sources
that develop these arguments in detail. But even a cursory glimpse at corporate
scholarship at the turn of the millennium offers a number of important observations.
Most important, the new theories promise to advance our understanding of corporate
purpose far beyond the old, stale "shareholders-versus-stakeholders" and
"shareholders-versus-society" debates. By revealing how a singled-minded focus on
share price endangers shareholders themselves, they also demonstrate how the
perceived gap between the interests of shareholders and those of stakeholders and the
broader society may be far narrower than commonly understood.

3. The Theoretical Case Against Shareholder Primacy: What Do
Shareholders Really Value?
3. 1. Market Inefficiency and Divide Between Short-Term Speculators and
Long-Term Investors
Of all the weaknesses of the "standard" model described by Kraakman and
Hansmann, one in particular has captured the attention of the business community

As UCLA law professor Iman Anabtawi has noted, this approach allows shareholder primacy
theorists to characterize shareholders "as having interests that are fundamentally in harmony with one
another." Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
21

561, 564 (2006).
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almost from the beginning of the model's ascendance. This weakness is the standard
model's need to assume the stock market is "fundamental value efficient."
The literature on market efficiency is enormous. Nevertheless, the basic idea
can be easily summarized. In brief, a stock market is deemed "fundamental value
efficient" to the extent the market price of a company's stock incorporates all the
information relevant to its value so effectively that the market price reflects the best
possible estimate of the stock's fundamental economic value in terms of its likely
future risks and returns. In such a market, there is no need for an investor to stay up
late trying to figure out what a particular stock is really worth, because the market has
already done her valuation homework for her. Nor is there any need to worry about
whether today's stock price reflects the firm's long-run value. In a fundamental value
efficient market, the long run and the short run merge, because there only one
accurate way to measure a stock's future risks and returns: by today's market price.
Even during the 1970s and 1980s--the heyday of efficient market theory and
the period during which the shareholder primacy model came to dominate academic
thinking about corporate law-many experienced business people believed stock
prices often failed to reflect reasonable estimates of fundamental value. (Renowned
corporate lawyer Marty Lipton advanced this argument in 1979 in an early and
famous challenge to shareholder primacy thinking.) 22 Since the Crash of 1987 and
the bursting of the 1990s Internet bubble, doubts have become even more
widespread. This is true even among finance theorists, the original inventors of
efficient market theory and once its most vocal supporters. Finance economists are
now developing ideas and producing empirical studies that challenge the theoretical
and empirical validity of efficient market theory, including heterogeneous
expectations asset pricing models; an emerging literature on the limits of arbitrage;
and the behavioral finance literature.23
If, as the growing "New Finance" literature suggests, stock prices can depart
significantly from rational estimates of fundamental value, the possibility arises that
business strategies that raise share price in the short term can harm firm value and
shareholder wealth over the long term. The result is a conflict of interest between
relatively short-term investors (e.g., hedge funds that hold shares only a few months
or even only a few minutes) and investors who expect to hold shares for longer
See Martin Lipton, "Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom", 35 Bus. Lawyer 101 (1979).
For a survey see Lynn A. Stout, "The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the
New Finance", 28 J. Corp. L. 635 (2003). See also Lynn A. Stout, "Risk, Speculation, and OTC
Derivatives" An Inaugural Essay for Convivium, Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium. 1
(1) (January 2011), commented by Yuri Biondi, "Disagreement-Based Trading and Speculation:
Implications for Financial Regulation and Economic Theory", Accounting, Economics, and Law: A
Convivium. 1 (1) (January 2011), and Pierre-Charles M. Pradier, "Administering Systemic Risk vs.
Administering Justice: What Can We Do Now that We Have Agreed to Pay Differences?",
Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium. 1 (1) (January 2011).
22
23
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periods (e.g., mom-and-pop investors saving for retirement or a child's college
tuition).
One possible solution to the conflict is for both groups to cede control to a
board of directors that has the authority to pursue business strategies that preserve
long term value, even if these strategies don't produce immediate gains in share price
(e.g., investing in research and development, or in employee or community relations).
This idea supports arguments raised over the years by a variety of governance experts
who have suggested that director authority can sometimes benefit shareholders by
protecting long-term value, even while short-term share price languishes. 24
3. 2. Capital "Lock In" and Differences in Shareholders'Demands for
Liquidity
Corporations have traditionally been defined as entities with the standard attributes of
limited shareholder liability, centralized management, perpetual life, and freely
transferable shares. In recent years, however, a variety of scholars, including Harold
Demsetz, Margaret Blair, and Hansmann and Kraakman themselves, 25 have argued
that corporate entities are also marked by a fifth essential attribute that Blair dubs
"capital lock in" and Hansmann and Kraakman call corporate "asset shielding."
These phrases capture the notion that equity investors in a corporation, unlike
investors in a partnership or proprietorship, cannot unilaterally withdraw their capital
from the firm. If they want their money back, they cannot simply demand the
corporation return it. Their only hope is to find another investor willing to buy their
shares in the secondary market.
Why would investors be willing to sacrifice liquidity this way? Blair has
emphasized how capital lock-in protects equity investors from the risk their fellow
equity holders might want, or need, to withdraw their investment from the firm,
triggering a dissolution or "fire sale" of corporate assets. Thus lock-in is essential for
pursuing long-term corporate projects that require large amounts of firm-specific
assets (e.g., building a railroad, manufacturing plant, or brand name) that cannot be
easily liquidated or sold without harming their value. Hansmann and Kraakman have
See, e.g., Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, "Corporate Policy and the Coherence of
Delaware Takeover Law", 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 523 (2003); Reinier Kraakman, "Taking Discounts
Seriously", 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891 (1988); Lipton, supra note 21; Lynn A. Stout, "Are Takeover
Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law", 99 Yale L. J. 1235
(1990).
25 See Margaret M. Blair, "Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century", 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 387 (2003); Harold Demsetz, The
Economics of the Business Firm: Seven CriticalCommentaries50-51 (1995) (discussing "the absence
of a repurchase condition"); Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, "The Essential Role of
Organizational Law", 110 Yale L. J. 387 (2000).
24
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argued that what they call corporate asset shielding may also encourage creditors to
lend the firm, by similarly protecting their interests from impecunious (or
opportunistic) shareholder demands for a return of capital.
For a variety of reasons, explicit contracts often cannot lock in capital
effectively. Incorporation offers an alternative means of achieving lock in, because
the corporate entity becomes the legal "owner" of the firm's specific assets and
control of the firm rests in the hands of a board. Thus lock in supports the claim that
director control can serve investor interests ex ante even as it weakens investor
control ex post, by reassuring both creditors and other equity investors they can safely
invest in or lend to the firm. In the process, it provides normative support for board
decisions that benefit shareholders and creditors alike by shielding the firm's specific
assets from shareholder attempts to withdraw capital.
3. 3. Team ProductionTheory and the Problem of Ex Post Shareholder
Opportunism
Like lock-in theory, team production theory26 focuses on the economic importance of
firm specific investment. Team production theory recognizes, however, that creditors
and equity investors are not the only groups whose resources can be converted into
firm specific assets. Employees, for example, may make specific investments by
putting in time and effort far beyond the minimum their contracts require, or by
developing knowledge, skills, and relationships of greater value to the firm than any
other potential employer. Customers may invest time and effort becoming familiar
with the firm's products. Local communities may build roads, schools, and other
specialized infrastructure to support the firm's manufacturing plant or headquarters.
It is often in shareholders' ex ante interest to encourage such firm-specific
stakeholder investments. For example, in order to succeed, a railroad company needs
more than investor money to build tracks and buy rail cars; it also needs local
employees with specialized skills, commuters who live and work along the rail line,
and municipal governments to build and support the infrastructure in the towns along
the line. However, once these stakeholder investments have been made, the
shareholders in the railroad company might profit from opportunistic strategies that
threaten to destroy their value, e.g., by threatening to fire loyal railroad employees
unless they take a pay cut, or threatening to close a station unless the local
government promises more tax breaks. Formal contracts may provide inadequate
protection against such shareholder opportunism. As an alternative, shareholders
might reassure stakeholder investors and encourage their specific investment by
ceding control to a board that cannot personally profit (as shareholders can) from

26

See Blair & Stout, supra note 12.
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business strategies that enhance shareholder wealth by opportunistically threatening
the value of other stakeholders' specific investments. Again, the team production
approach supports a director-centric governance structure that serves shareholders' ex
ante interests by giving boards broad ex post discretion to favour other
constituencies.
3. 4. UndiversifiedShareholders Versus Universal Investors
The standard shareholder primacy model assumes that shareholder wealth is best
maximized by maximizing the price of a particular company's shares. In other words,
it looks at the question of shareholder wealth from the perspective of a hypothetical
shareholder with only one asset, equity shares in Firm A.
Very often, however, directors and executives can increase the share price of
Firm A by pursing strategies that impose costs on Firm B. For example, Microsoft
might pursue monopolistic acquisitions or anticompetitive strategies that allow it to
charge its corporate customers higher prices for lower-quality software. Alternatively,
a board might embrace risky projects that raise Firm A's share price at the expense of
Firm A's bondholders. Consider Enron's decision to load up on risky energy
derivatives, or BP's decision to cut safety corners in off-shore drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico.
Classic shareholder primacy thus invites an investing "tragedy of the
commons" where shareholders seeking to maximize their returns from particular
investments create external costs that harm their value of their own, and other
investors,' interests. This tragedy of the investing commons is of special concern to
the so-called universal investor - the highly diversified pension or mutual fund that
owns stocks and bonds in many different firms. Moreover, pension and mutual funds
are fiduciaries for individual beneficiaries who are themselves customers and
employees of firms, and who are also biological organisms that depend on their
environment. One can question whether such fiduciaries truly serve their individual
beneficiaries' interests by supporting business strategies that raise share price by
harming employees or hurting customers, or by creating an unhealthful environment.
Proponents of the universal investor idea (most notably, investor activist Bob
MonkS27 and business professors James Hawley and Andrew Williams)28 have tended
to focus on the notion that the best way to overcome the tragedy of the investing
commons and to get corporations to serve the interests of the universal investor rather
than the hypothetical undiversified shareholder is to increase the political power of
diversified pension funds and mutual funds. This idea has value, but diversified
pension and mutual funds like all diversified investors tend toward rational apathy,
27

28

Robert A.G. Monks, The New GlobalInvestors (2001).
James P. Hawley and Andrew T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism (2000)
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and may not serve as an adequate brake against the demands of hedge funds and other
undiversified shareholders that push corporate boards to pursue "rob Peter to pay
Paul" business strategies. Nor is there reason to think many pension or mutual fund
managers would feel legally comfortable trying to balance their beneficiaries'
interests as fund investors against their other human interests (e.g. as employees).
Director control of public corporations offers another, albeit imperfect,
vehicle for protecting the interests of universal investors. This is because directors
have no innate interest in favoring the interests of undiversified shareholders over the
interests of the universal investor who is also a shareholder. As a result, directors
who are free to pursue corporate goals other than maximizing share price are also free
to pursue strategies that ultimately benefit the universal investor who is also a
creditor, a shareholder in other firms, an employee, a customer, and an organism
dependent on its environment.
3. 5. Director Control and the Interests of ProsocialShareholders
To be a universal investor, one must still be a shareholder, either directly or through a
diversified pension or mutual fund. But what of the interests of employees and
customers who do not also hold stock in a particular company? What of community
and environmental concerns above and beyond those that affect the health and wealth
of the moneyed "investing class?"
Conventional shareholder primacy theory presumes that investors, universal
or not, care only about themselves. There is a substantial body of evidence from the
social sciences, however, including extensive evidence from experiments with human
subjects, that documents that most people are to some degree altruistic and
"prosocial." 2 9 Prosocial shareholders are willing to sacrifice at least some corporate
profits in order to benefit, or at least avoid harming, employees, consumers, society,
or the environment. Direct evidence for this can be found in the significant and
growing investor interest for "social" investment funds.o
Einer Elhauge has employed the idea of pro-sociality as an interesting
platform for yet another theory of how director control benefits shareholders. This
theory recognizes that, just as shareholders face structural obstacles bringing
corporations to heel to serve their economic interests, they face obstacles making
firms serve their altruistic desires. For a host of reasons-including lack of access,
lack of time, lack of information, and their own rational apathy-shareholders often
find it difficult to determine whether and to what extent the corporations they invest
See generally Lynn Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People (2011).
30 See Cynthia William, "The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency",
112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (2000).
31 See Elhauge, supra note 13.
29
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in are reaping profits from socially harmful behavior. Directors stand in a much better
position to make such judgments. Also, anonymous shareholders are largely insulated
from shaming or other "social sanctions" that follow corporate misbehavior, where
directors are not. The end result is that corporations run by directors who enjoy a
range of authority to sacrifice profits in the public interest may end up serving
investors' interests-including investors' altruistic, prosocial interests--better than
corporations run according to the "standard model" would.

Conclusion: Some Lessons from the New Thinking
Until recently, it has been commonplace to conceptualize the debate over the purpose
of the public corporation as a duel between those who think directors ought to run
corporations only to maximize shareholder wealth as measured by stock price, and
those who think boards ought to consider the interests of others in society as well.
The first group has been associated with economic theory, and the second with
political agendas.
By the turn of the millennium, shareholder primacy thinking shows signs of
becoming far more subtle. Scholars increasingly argue that, for a variety of reasons,
shareholdersthemselves might prefer that public corporations be controlled primarily
by boards of directors, and also prefer that these boards enjoy a wide range of
discretion to consider the interests of stakeholders and the broader society. These new
interpretations of what different shareholders truly "value" offer to explain a number
of otherwise-puzzling empirical realities of corporate law and practice. Along the
way, they also offer a number of interesting and potentially useful insights into the
proper purpose of the business corporation.
Perhaps the first lesson is that conventional shareholder primacy is no longer
the only intellectually respectable game in town. Indeed, shareholder primacy theory
suffers from a potentially fatal weakness. As Stephen Bainbridge has pointed out, the
chief criterion for any model of the corporation must be the model's ability to predict
the separation of ownership and control that is the hallmark of the public firm.32 The
standard shareholder-oriented model fails this basic criterion. In contrast, each of
the five theories discussed in the Essay can explain the twin anomalies of substantial
director autonomy under the default rules of corporate law, and promoter preference
for enhancing director power in firms going public. In the process, they undermine
the conventional wisdom that directors and executives who fail to focus obsessively
on rising a company's share price are somehow at fault or remiss in their duties. This
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, "The Board of Directors as a Nexus of Contracts", 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3
(2002).
33 See Stout, "The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance", 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 667 (2003).
32
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common notion, embraced in most corporate law and business classes and also in
many boardrooms and the pages of the financial press, may be not only incorrect, but
hazardous to investors' collective health.
Second, each of these five theories explains the empirical observation that
investors purchasing stock in public companies seem to prefer their companies be
governed by a board of directors largely insulated from shareholders' command and
control, even as this makes it more difficult for shareholders to stop the board from
pursuing strategies that benefit stakeholders or society at the expense of share price.
In particular, each of the theories suggests that shareholders, like the mythic hero
Ulysses, benefit from "tying their own hands" and ceding control over corporate
assets and earnings to boards. This idea offers insights into such notions as the claim
that a business strategy that decreases share price nevertheless benefits shareholders
"in the long run," or the idea that action that harms shareholders nevertheless helps
"the firm." They also illustrate how conventional shareholder primacy papers over
the very real schisms between different shareholders' interests and values by reducing
shareholders to their lowest common human denominator, implicitly assuming they
are uniformly short-sighted, impecunious, opportunistic, self-destructive, and
psychopathically indifferent to the fates of others, future generations, and the planet.
Third, by drawing attention to differences in shareholder interests and values,
these theories suggest how director governance of public companies that benefits
most investors most of the time can nevertheless cut against the interests of certain
shareholders at certain times. The theories thus suggest how boards can play a crucial
role in mediating between different shareholders' demands, and steer the corporate
ship of state in directions that decently satisfy the needs of most rather than
maximizing the interests of a narrow subgroup. The theories also predict-in accord
with what we actually observe-that even while investors remain happy to purchase
shares in director-run public companies ex ante, for example at the IPO stage, certain
shareholder groups are equally happy to protest, and even try to overturn, director
governance rules ex post.34 Although such protests and "reform proposals" do not
necessarily serve the interests of investors as a class, they can serve the interests of
particular subgroups of investors in particular situations. 35
A fourth and related point is that U.S. regulators and policymakers should not
reflexively respond to every business crisis or scandal de jour by trying to "reform"
corporate law to give shareholders greater power. The assumption often seems to be
that anything that gives shareholders greater leverage necessarily serves investors'
interests. The new scholarship severs this supposed linkage. While the elimination of
staggered boards, the creation of a new shareholder right to vote on executive
See Robert Daines and Michael Klausner, "Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover
Protections in IPOs", 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83 (2001).
35 See generally Anabtawi, supra note 20 (discussing conflicts of interest between shareholders).
34
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compensation, etc., can all attract political support by promising an immediate
windfall to certain types of shareholders, there is every reason to suspect such
"shareholder democracy"-enhancing rules may ultimately work against the interests
of the investing class as a whole.
Fifth, this analysis cautions even more strongly against attempts to export the
"standard shareholder-oriented model" abroad. During the 1970s, many experts
argued that U.S. corporations could learn from the example of highly-successful,
stakeholder-friendly German and Japanese firms. With the decline of the Japanese
and German economies and the bubble-fuelled ascendancy of the U.S. stock market
during the 1990s, however, the advice tended to flow the other way. Corporate
governance experts trumpeted the success of the "U.S. model" and counselled other
countries to follow our lead by moving their corporate law rules closer to shareholder
primacy. A few nations actually heeded this advice, sometimes with disastrous
results.36 The new literature suggests at least two reasons why governance experts
who tout the "U.S. model" abroad may, in fact, be exporting damaged goods. First, as
already noted, the standard shareholder-oriented model does not actually describe
U.S. law, and this is no accident: the "standard" model in fact does not benefit
investors in public companies. Second, the U.S.'s director-centric governance rules
evolved to solve the problems of companies with widely-dispersed share ownership,
not functionally "private" companies with controlling shareholders. Accordingly, we
may do other nations whose companies tend to have controlling shareholders a grave
disservice by urging them to adopt rules that are not designed for that share
ownership pattern.
Finally, by suggesting how director governance rules ultimately serve public
shareholders' interests better than shareholder-centred governance rules would, the
five theories of director governance examined here may go a long way toward
resolving the debate over corporate purpose. Each of the five theories suggests
different and increasingly broad reasons why shareholders might not only want to
grant boards the sort of authority that permits them to serve other stakeholders at
shareholders' expense, but actually prefer that boards do this. Because the five
theories provide different accounts of exactly what range of "outside" interests
shareholders would like directors to consider-creditors? employees? society as a
whole?--the area of dispute that remains in the Great Debate will depend to some
extent on exactly how many, and which, theories of director primacy one subscribes
to. But to the observer who finds merit in all five-and, as I have argued, all five
have merit-the Great Debate, if not entirely resolved, is at least diminished in scope
and importance.

See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, "Russian Privatization and
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong", 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (2000).
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